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ABSTRACT
Context processing is the foundation of a model of 
cognitive control set forth by T.S. Braver and colleagues 
(Braver et al., 2001).- According to this model, cognitive 
functions, such as attention, inhibition and working 
memory are the product of a single, context processing 
mechanism. Deficits in context processing have been 
associated with cognitive development in children, healthy 
aging, as well as individuals suffering from 
schizophrenia. The goal of the present investigation was 
to apply Braver's model of cognitive control to groups 
selected on their differences in trait anxiety and explore 
their relationship. Performance on two versions of the 
AX-CPT (Standard and Distracter) was compared between a 
high and a low trait anxiety group. The results indicate 
that there is evidence for group differences in context 
processing related to trait anxiety level. Interestingly, 
these differences were not evident during the Standard 
AX-CPT and both groups displayed good context processing 
regardless of trait anxiety level. However, when cognitive 
demand was increased during the Distracter AX-CPT, stable 
group differences indicated that although the low anxiety 
group sustained good context processing, the high anxiety 
group failed to do so. These results, although taken with 
iii
caution, are an indication of the relationship between 
anxiety and context processing deficits. These findings 
warrant the need for future research of this relationship 
and have important implications for both the field of 
basic cognitive research, as well as research that can be 
applied to the understanding of the origin and 
perpetuation of anxiety symptoms and their impact on the 
workplace.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
People in today's world must function more like 
impeccably programmed computers in order to efficiently 
process the endless stream of information coming from the 
environment. An enormous portion of the stimuli that reach 
the senses are being processed by the nervous system 
almost automatically without leaving a conscious trace. 
This processing system must be designed to work in our 
best interest and the end result of its work that is 
brought to one's conscious attention must ensure 
efficiency and promote survival, at the least. On one 
hand, in every day life we benefit from the automatic 
nature of processes - from maintaining normal vital 
function, vision, hearing to reading, driving and playing 
a familiar musical piece on the piano. On the other hand, 
people desire to be highly motivated, independent 
cognitive individuals who are able to freely and 
voluntarily control their behavior. The question of how 
independent the voluntary and automatic processes actually 
are has been investigated not once in the literature.
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Context Processing
Introduction to Cognitive Control
The study of high-level cognition processes is of 
fundamental significance for the understanding of the 
human psyche. The complexity of the mechanisms behind 
processes such as attention, inhibition, decision-making 
and problem solving is often. To exercise cognitive 
control means to be able to override a reflexatory , 
reaction to a particular stimulus in favor of a more 
complex and sophisticated sequence of actions. Thus, it is 
difficult to study cognitive control in animal models. We 
take for granted the exquisite ability of the human brain 
to maintain the body still while a doctor is administering 
a painful but life saving treatment or to solve an algebra 
problem in a creative and innovative way. Cognitive 
control can assist with a top-down approach to solve a 
particular problem or make a decision, rather than relying 
solely on what is presented as stimuli in the immediate 
environment. In other words, it represents the ability to 
actively suppress a particular train of thought or an 
automatic reaction or to dynamically switch one's 
attention from one task to another.
Cognitive control is one if the manifestations of the 
highly developed human brain and its exceedingly powerful 
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abilities to act and not simply react in the environment. 
People are faced with the necessity to learn and perform 
new skills and tasks that are high in complexity and 
demand cognitive power. In summary, using cognitive 
control one is able to selectively attend to task relevant 
information in the environment, use memory capacity and 
previously stored information effectively while inhibiting 
irrelevant and distractive stimuli.
Context Processing Model of Cognitive Control
A recently developed model of cognitive control 
allows for all three of its major components (attention, 
inhibition and working memory) to be examined within a 
single processing unit (Braver et al., 2001; Braver & 
Barch, 2002). According to Braver and his colleagues, 
exercising cognitive control effectively results in the 
ability to flexibly adapt to the different demands of the 
environment and act accordingly. Braver proposed that 
successful execution of the cognitive functions related to 
attention and inhibition can be accomplished by actively 
representing and maintaining all information that is 
relevant. In Braver's model any relevant information is 
what is referred to as the context. Thus, by effectively 
maintaining the context, one can successfully focus 
attention to important stimuli, appropriately inhibit 
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irrelevant ones and therefore minimize interference and 
maximize performance. This function is undertaken by a 
context-processing unit which regulates all information 
that may guide future behavior, and it is proposed to 
function as a separate mechanism within working memory 
(Braver & Barch, 2002) .
Nearly every situation a person encounters on a daily 
basis calls for a sequence of covert (thoughts) and overt 
(behavior) processes that are appropriate for the specific 
situation. In many cases, a particular behavior, such as 
answering a ringing telephone is absolutely appropriate. 
Answering a telephone while driving, however, may not only 
be out of place, but it can endanger someone. Successfully 
exercised cognitive control allows for the two situations 
to be differentiated and for the behavior to be displayed 
in the former and inhibited in latter. The set of rules in 
this case, that determine in which situation to answer the 
telephone, could be thought of as the context. In Braver's 
theory, context is defined as a form of an internal 
representation of any information that may be related to 
an ongoing task or behavior (Braver & Barch, 2002). Thus, 
context can be the mental framework which when at work can 
lead to accurate decisions on what behavior is executed 
and what inhibited, which stimuli in the environment are 
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attended to and which are ignored. Using context 
successfully can lead the individual to attain a 
particular target, such as following a particular strategy 
can help a chess player to win an important match. This 
means that the player must plan which figures to move 
sometimes well in advance in order to fit his/her strategy 
goal. Therefore, working within a particular context can 
also guide subsequent decisions. The representation of 
context is thought to be very active and a constantly 
updating unit. Naturally, in a dynamic environment where 
changes occur at a high rate, keeping up with the initial 
"instructions" from the context can be challenging. For 
example, taking the moves made by the chess player 
independent from one another places different demands on 
one's cognitive control than if they were to be considered 
part of an overarching strategy to corner an opponent and 
win the game. Not taking an obviously unprotected 
opponent's figure in order to follow a predetermined path 
can be difficult at the time but beneficial in the long 
run. In the same way, context processing is especially 
important when a routinely appropriate behavior has to be 
inhibited in order for a goal oriented one to take place. 
In fact, intact context processing leads to attention and 
inhibition without directly exercising either process.
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Attending or inhibiting a particular aspect of the 
environment, for example is facilitated by the information 
used in the context-processing unit. A key feature of 
Braver's model is that its components account for 
processes involved not only in inhibitory responses, but 
also in ones that require attention. The benefit to 
Braver's model, however, is that they are not being 
examined independently but as underlying processes of a 
single context-processing unit.
Neurobiology
A crucial part of Braver's research is aimed to 
establish the idea that there are active neurobiological 
pathways responsible for his model of cognitive control 
(Braver et al., 2001). The internal representations of the 
context, as well as their active maintenance are suggested 
to be neural pathways in a portion of the brain, called 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DL-PFC). This brain 
region is associated with higher cognitive functioning, 
decision-making and problem solving, as well as with the 
processes related to working memory. Interestingly, the 
neurotransmitter dopamine (DA) has an active network of 
pathways in the DL-PFC and it has been associated to 
various cognitive processes, such as attention and 
inhibition (Braver et al., 2001). For example, tasks that 
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require the active use of working memory have been shown 
to suffer serous deficits in performance for individuals 
with lower levels of DA (Luciana, Collins, & Depue, 1998). 
When a small dose of a DA antagonist was administered to 
participants in their experiment, performance on a 
cognitive control task seemed to deteriorate in comparison 
with participants with normal DA levels (Braver et al., 
2001; Cohen, Braver, & Brown, 2002). Therefore, Braver's 
theory aims to establish a possible model where the DL-PFC 
region of the brain and DA play an important role in 
cognitive processing, namely the active representation and 
update of relevant context.
The specific function that each of the above 
components plays in cognitive processing has not been 
clearly explained by previous research. DA seems to be 
associated with cognitive deficits and lesions to the 
DL-PFC appear to result in cognitive impairment, but the 
precise mechanisms through which this takes place have 
been successfully presented only in Braver's model. There 
are several key components of Braver's neural network that 
will be described in detail next (Figure 1). First, the 
system has an input flow where the incoming information 
from the environment enters directly (input unit). Then 
this information undergoes some internal processing and 
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eventually results in some response. This process simply 
describes a stimulus - response pattern. When taking 
context processing into, account, Braver adds a component 
that he calls the "context layer". The context layer, 
which is found within the DL-PFC, serves as a mediator of 
the simple stimulus - response reaction. The incoming flow 
is being affected by the context before it is being 
released as a response. Braver points out three important 
characteristics of the context layer that cause its 
influence over the stimulus-response system (Figure 1). 
First, an active network of neuronal connections is 
especially pronounced in the context layer. This network's 
purpose is to keep the information in the 
context-processing unit in active circulation and 
maintenance. Thus, even if the initial stream of incoming 
information is being interrupted, the context unit can 
sustain content and continue to feed into the response 
pathways. This process is called updating. This, in turn, 
is possible because the context unit has pathways 
connecting to the direct stimulus-response pathways. 
Interestingly, there are two independent pathways relaying 
information from and back to the context-processing unit. 
The first pathway, from the context unit to the direct 
stimulus-response pathway, serves to "bias" otherwise 
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independent events with the information that is being 
actively represented in the context-processing unit. For 
instance, if we go back to our chess player example, the 
strategy of winning the match is being actively 
represented and maintained in the context-processing unit. 
If we take each move independently, the direct stimulus 
response pathway may be a sufficient mechanism. However, 
when the player has to choose among several options, the 
context-processing unit will activate its connection to 
the direct pathway in order to produce a biased response 
favoring the overall strategy to win the game over any 
other possible move. Interestingly, this is true 
especially when the player has to show patience and 
inhibit an obvious, dominant move. This is a perfect 
example of cognitive control and inhibition where a weaker 
pathway can influence the response over a stronger one.
An interesting question, however, may be asked - how 
can the chess player keep his/her strategy protected from 
all incoming information resulting from the progress of 
the game and at the same time adjust it according to the 
opponent's surprising moves? This incoming information may 
be distractive and irrelevant and it is crucial for the 
chess player to protect his/her game strategy intact and 
focused. According to Braver's model, the context 
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processing unit is somewhat protected from the constant 
flow of information. Its second connection, the one coming 
from the direct pathway, does not allow the free and 
constant flow to enter the context unit. It serves as a 
gateway that protects and feeds into the unit whenever 
appropriate. It has been suggested that DA projections 
assist in accomplishing this complicated process (Braver 
et al., 2001). When the dopamine neurons are active, 
information can enter the context layer so it is in 
connection with any changes in the incoming demands as 
well as its context representations are being updated. In 
turn, when the pathway is not active, no incoming 
information enters the context-processing layer, 
preserving its contents from competing and distracting 
stimuli. In summary, Braver's model represents an active, 
neural based system that allows for information to be 
actively represented in a single context processing unit, 
which serves as the basis for both the attentional and 
inhibitory functions of cognitive control.
Testing Braver's Model
To test his model, Braver (Braver et al., 2001; 
Braver & Barch, 2002) adopted a computer-based cognitive 
task known as the AX-CPT (Continuous Performance Task). 
The main -goal of the participant in the AX-CPT is to
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differentiate between target and non-target trials as 
quickly and accurately as possible. In the AX-CPT each 
trial consists of a sequential presentation of two letters 
- cue and probe (Figure 3). The target trials are those 
where a letter "A" is the cue and letter "X" is the probe. 
All other combinations of letters are to be regarded as 
non-target and responded to as such. For the purposes of 
the description of the task, every non-A cue will be 
referred to as a B-cue and every non-X probe will be 
referred to as a Y-probe. Therefore, a condition which 
consists of a cue letter "A" and a non-X probe will be 
referred to as the AY condition; a non-A cue and an X 
probe will be referred to as a BX condition, and a non-A 
cue combined with a non-X probe will be a BX condition. 
Braver suggested that these conditions, serve as a test for 
how well context is represented in one's working memory. 
To create particular cognitive biases, the proportion of 
target and non-target trials is manipulated within a test 
list. In fact, participants are exposed to target trials 
(AX) 70% of the time. This manipulation has specific 
consequences - two cognitive biases are created. First, an 
expectation bias occurs when the cue letter A is 
presented. Individuals learn to use the cue letter A to 
predict the occurrence of a target probe X because this, 
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in fact, is the case with 70% of the trials. In this case, 
context processing serves as an agent that directs one's 
attention to task relevant information - the target letter 
A. This bias becomes evident on trials where the cue 
letter A is not.followed by the usual target probe X, but 
by any non-X letter. In these situations, individuals are 
more inclined to respond to the trial as a target even if 
the probe is a non-X letter and they should regard it as a 
non-target trial. As a result, AY trials become 
susceptible to false alarm type of responses. Further, 
every time individuals are presented with a target probe 
"X", their response is also affected by the same bias. 
They must use context processing effectively to inhibit 
the reactive response to a target probe "X" on trials with 
non-A cues (.BX trials) . As a result, the BX trials become 
susceptible to false alarm errors as well and serve as an 
indicator for how well the inhibitory properties of the 
context-processing unit are functioning.
The AX-CPT is a suitable way to test Braver's model 
of context processing also because it simultaneously 
accounts for processes underlying attention and 
inhibition. Braver suggests that both these principles are 
functioning within the idea of context processing (Braver 
et al., 2001). Specifically, when context is represented 
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internally it can guide one's attention toward a 
particular stimulus or serve as an inhibitory agent for 
another stimulus. Generally, each trial provides two 
pieces of information - one comes from the cue and one 
from the probe. In some instances, the cue and probe are 
consistent as indicators for a target or non-target/
response. For example, when the cue letter is A and the 
probe letter is X, the response should be a target 
response and both cue and probe correspond to it. When 
there is a non-target cue (any non-A letter) and a 
non-target probe (any non-X letter), the response should 
be non-target and it should be facilitated because both 
cue and probe indicate a non-target response. Therefore, 
in the AX and BY trials, cue and probe both suggest a 
particular response (target or non target). As mentioned 
earlier, the bias created by the high frequency of AX 
target trials creates a specific bias whenever the cue A 
and probe X are presented. Making a correct response is 
more challenging when the cue suggests a target response, 
but the probe is a non-target one, or vice versa (BX and 
AY trails). For instance, inhibition is required in BX 
trials where the participant has to use the representation 
of the cue B actively in order to suppress a target 
response to the probe X. Having a preserved representation 
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of the cue B, as a non-target cue, helps for the 
successful inhibition of a subsequent target response to 
the target probe. Therefore, superior inhibition is tested 
for and evident on all BX trials. Specifically, on BX 
trials good context processing leads to a decrease in the 
amount of errors - participants correctly identify B as a 
non-target cue and successfully inhibit target response, 
thus eliciting a correct response. On the other hand, the 
same representation on context can impair performance on 
other trials, namely, when a participant is presented with 
an AY trial. In this case, the active representation of 
the target cue A prepares for a strong tendency for a 
target response to the probe even if it is not a target 
probe X. Good context processing, in this case, impairs 
performance on AY trials.
In summary, good context processing is evident when 
participants make few errors in BX trials, where they have 
effectively used the non-target cue B and inhibited the 
target response to the target probe X (Figure 2). Also, 
good context processing is evident when participants 
commit more errors in AY trials. Here, the target cue A is 
vividly represented in context processing and facilitated 
by the 70% AX rate bias leads to a false alarm and thus a 
target response on a non-target probe Y. This is
14
counterintuitive in the sense that more errors in AY 
condition suggest good context processing, but when the 
data are examined carefully the distinct pattern of 
responses on BX and AY trials can be a great illustration 
of how context can lead to attention or inhibition on the 
same task. More specifically, examining performance in 
these two types, of trials one can collect evidence for the 
quality of context processing and can further specify 
whether potential problems are due to impaired attention, 
or impaired inhibition or both.
Manipulating the delay between cue and probe 
presentation allows for additional examination of context 
processing. Namely, according to Braver's model the 
representation of context has to be actively represented, 
maintained and updated over some period of time in order 
for good performance to occur (Braver et al., 2001). If 
this is fact is the case, manipulating the length of delay 
between cue and probe provides additional information. For 
instance, if context processing is intact, the difference 
between a trial with a short cue-probe delay and a trial 
with a longer delay would not be pronounced. If the 
representation of the cue and maintenance of context 
function properly, increasing the delay should not affect 
performance. If, however, context processing is impaired, 
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cue-probe delay variations will be evident in a distinct 
pattern of results (Figure 3). Specifically, if the cue 
representation is decaying over the duration of the delay, 
there will be more errors in the long delay BX condition 
in comparison with errors in the short delay BX condition. 
Interestingly, errors in the long delay AY condition will 
decrease in comparison with errors in a short delay AY, 
because of the decayed cue representation and its reduced 
similarity to the target response. A fascinating aspect of 
the AX-CPT task is that each condition relies on a 
distinct cognitive process (attention or inhibition, for 
example) and good performance is granted when a distinct 
mechanism within the context-processing unit is 
functioning properly (cue representation or maintenance, 
for example). This way the model makes very specific 
predictions about the behavioral pattern of responses on 
the AX-CPT task and can be a useful tool in identifying 
cognitive impairments that are due to context processing 
deficits.
Studies on Healthy Aging
Deficits across various cognitive domains have been 
documented to accompany healthy aging adults (Braver et 
al., 2001). For instance, impairments concerning episodic 
and working memory are evident; also, studies with older 
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adults have revealed problems with selective attention and 
inhibition. Braver suggests that there is a single 
underlying mechanism that deteriorates with age and is 
responsible for these multiple deficits (Braver et al., 
2001). Braver's results come mainly from studies on aging, 
where poor context processing is observed in Alzheimer's 
patients whose cognitive functioning is grossly impaired 
by profound brain cell loss (Braver & Barch, 2002). 
Alzheimer's patients have immense difficulty with 
inhibition and therefore commit a large number of errors 
as a result of the inhibition bias, in comparison with 
healthy control individuals. Alzheimer's patients commit 
significantly fewer errors in the attention bias, which 
signals poor attention and representation. In other words, 
Braver's model relates disturbances found in the DL-PFC 
and the DA system with the behavioral deficits displayed 
by the aging population. A similar pattern is displayed by 
the healthy aging population (Braver & Cohen, 2001; Braver 
& Barch, 2002) . When compared to control participants, the 
aging sample displays a very distinct pattern of results 
on the AX-CPT task. Namely, performance dependent on 
effective inhibition suffers and is demonstrated with 
increased the error rate on BX trials. Thus, the inability 
to inhibit a target response is present. Also, a decreased 
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amount of AY errors signals problems with attention, where 
the target cue A is not being represented affectively. If 
good context processing, as explained in the above 
paragraphs, is demonstrated by a lot of AY errors and few 
BX errors, healthy aging adult sample displays nearly the 
opposite pattern - fewer AY errors and many BX errors.
In other words, according to Braver's model, the 
natural deterioration of the DL-PFC with age is the single 
underlying mechanism that affects the effectiveness of the 
context processing unit and is therefore the basis for the 
various cognitive deficits displayed by older adults.
Anxiety
Working Memory
One common goal of science is to explain the changes 
in behavior that are observed among different populations. 
It is especially valuable when parsimony is achieved and 
multiple behavioral manifestations are associated with a 
single underlying mechanism. It is interesting to observe 
that there are other populations that exhibit similar, 
cognitive deficits to the ones investigated by Braver and 
his colleagues. Anxiety patients, for instance, display 
impairments in multiple cognitive tasks that rely on 
attention, inhibition and working memory. Nevertheless, a 
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unitary concept of the anxiety symptomatology is lacking 
in current literature'. The purpose of the following review 
of relevant literature is to demonstrate that although 
deficits in cognitive processes persist among individuals 
with anxiety symptoms, there is no agreement as to what 
mechanisms are responsible. A potential benefit of 
applying Braver's model to an anxiety sample is to capture 
a distinct behavioral pattern of responses that can be 
accounted for by deficits in the context processing 
mechanism. The concept of working memory was first 
proposed in 1974 as an alternative to the established 
model of short-term memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).
Instead of a storage unit alone, the new model described 
an active system where information was being perceived, 
transformed, integrated and stored. Working memory, 
according the Baddeley, is an information-processing unit 
composed of three major subcomponents. The most known and 
well-studied aspect of working memory is the phonological 
loop, or the fragment responsible for auditory stimuli. 
Also, it manipulates speech-related information such as 
language. The second component, the visuospatial 
sketchpad, holds and integrates both visual and spatial 
information. The executive component of working memory is 
the least investigated and is assumed to supervise, 
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integrate and govern incoming information from other two 
components, ultimately affecting behavior (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974). This way, the processes that occur within 
working memory assist one's response decision when 
competing stimuli are presented.
A large number of findings in the literature suggest 
that there is a link between performance on working memory 
tasks and anxiety. In fact, it has been demonstrated that 
high levels of anxiety are related to performance 
deficits. Empirical studies contrasting groups of 
individuals with high and low anxiety levels provide 
evidence to support this notion. In an experiment 
conducted by Macleod and Donnellan (1993), high and low 
anxiety students engaged in a reasoning task. Their 
performance was measured in two distinct conditions of 
high and low memory load. As expected, students in the 
high anxiety group were slower in the reasoning task 
displaying need for more time for decision making.
Interestingly, differences in the high and low memory load 
condition were found to affect the groups in a similar 
way. Indeed, the high memory load harshly disadvantaged 
the elevated anxiety group suggesting that limited working 
memory capacity is related to the performance deficit 
(MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993). In other words, anxiety 
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itself can put a strain on one's working memory capacity, 
and thus impair the ability to perform well.
Attention and Inhibition
Deficits in attention and inhibition are commonly 
found in individuals suffering from anxiety (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974; Kane & Engle, 2003). The approach through 
which scientists have examined these two processes, 
however, is far from unanimous. Some studies look at 
attention problems only; others focus on deficits in 
inhibition. Nevertheless, it is rather difficult to think 
of just attention or inhibition because they are like the 
flip sides of the same coin. When a person is attending 
actively to something, he/she is also actively inhibiting 
other stimuli that are present in the environment. Thus, 
the following review of literature will entail experiments 
that aim to reveal the role of both attention and 
inhibition among individuals suffering from anxiety.
Attention represents a perceptual process in which an 
organism actively focuses on a particular aspect of the 
environment while excluding the surroundings (Ackerman, 
1987). To ignore certain aspects of. the environment, 
however, is a dynamic and demanding process as well, and 
it is referred to as cognitive inhibition. Therefore, 
successful interaction with the world depends on one's 
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ability to both focus and sustain attention upon relevant, 
stimuli, and selectively inhibit distractor stimuli that 
are irrelevant to the task at stake. Previous findings 
suggest that the proper function of working memory is 
tightly related to both attention and inhibition.
According to a model developed by Hasher and Zacks (1988), 
attentional inhibition regulates any information that 
enters or leaves working memory. For instance, inhibitory 
mechanisms filter goal irrelevant stimuli before they 
enter working memory, thus allowing only goal relevant 
ones to be attended to. Thus, attention inhibition and 
working memory can prove to be quite useful in tasks where 
the target/non-target stimuli can change, or when one has 
to switch attention between relevant and irrelevant 
stimuli.
The Stroop Task
A popular measure of attention and inhibition in the 
past few decades has been the Stroop task. Here, 
participants are presented with words on a screen and are 
instructed to report the color of ink in which the words 
appear while ignoring the word's meaning (Kane & Engle,
2003).  In some cases, the meaning of the word and its 
color facilitate performance; for instance, the word 
"yellow" appearing in yellow ink, or the word "green" in 
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green ink. When participants encounter words that conflict 
with their color, such as the word "yellow" appearing in 
green ink, performance is compromised. It has been 
observed time and again, that when presented with 
conflicting stimuli most people tend to slow their 
response rate. In reference to cognitive control, 
successfully attending to the relevant feature of the 
stimulus (the color), while inhibiting the irrelevant one 
(the meaning of the word) ensures successful performance 
and, it is a sign of good processing skills.
It is believed that individuals who report 
experiencing anxiety symptoms perform differently on 
experimental tasks that put a high demand on cognitive 
processes, such as the Stroop task. A modified version of 
this task has been used largely to investigate an 
attentional bias that is exhibited by anxiety patients. 
Similar to the original version, in the emotional Stroop 
task, individuals are asked to name the color a word is 
printed in without reading the word itself For this 
version of the task, anxiety related and neutral words are 
presented in different color ink (MacLeod, 1991). The goal 
is to name the color the word is written in as fast as 
possible. Generally, when participants are presented with 
stimuli (words) that are anxiety provoking (e.g. death, 
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faint, rape etc.) their performance is diminished in 
comparison with performance to neutral stimuli. The 
intuition behind the emotional Stroop is that the semantic 
content of a word can produce additional interference 
(MacLeod, 1991). Specifically, reaction times are 
significantly slower in the anxiety condition, indicating 
that there is a bias for anxiety related information. In 
other words, anxiety related stimuli have the ability to 
involuntary capture one's attention and interfere with the 
speed of response. Further, the slower reaction times 
suggest that the participants may have a difficult time 
inhibiting the meaning of the anxiety related words, which 
in itself can degrade response time performance.
Good performance on the modified Stroop task can be 
achieved if the participants are able to successfully 
inhibit the meaning of the words and focus exclusively on 
the color that they are printed in. The use of this 
strategy, however, is being compromised among individuals 
with anxiety symptoms. This finding suggests that high 
anxiety individuals exhibit an attentional bias toward 
emotionally loaded stimuli; therefore, it takes longer for 
one to attend and name the color of a word if his/her 
attention is first drawn to the meaning of the word.
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However, results from emotional Stroop paradigms do 
not always replicate. Interestingly, there are instances 
when individuals with high anxiety are slower to name both 
neutral and loaded words (Mogg & Marden, 1990). One 
possible explanation for this discrepancy comes from the 
fact that individuals with high anxiety differ 
tremendously on stimuli that may be triggering their 
symptoms (gun shot for a post traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) sufferer, a spider for a person with 
arachnophobia). Further, most robust interference on the 
emotional Stroop task has been reported when the loaded 
words are particularly trigger specific (Hope et al., 
1990; Buckley, Blanchard, & Hickling, 2002; Thorpe & 
Salkovskis, 1997). MacLeod (1991) suggests that the 
specificity of the emotionally loaded words could serve as 
a confound explanation. In other words, war veterans who 
suffer from PTSD will respond slower to trauma words 
related to combat because these’are especially relevant 
for them. In this case, the discrepancy in the literature 
is explained by the selection of stimuli, rather than a 
particular processing mechanism.
Dot-Probe Task
Another popular task used to assess processing 
biases, especially attentional bias in various 
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populations, is the dot probe paradigm. In this task, 
individuals are asked to determine whether a dot has been 
presented on the left or right side of the screen. Before 
each presentation, two images appear on the screen. 
Similar to the emotional Stroop task, pictures are chosen 
to be either neutral or emotionally loaded. In anxiety 
individuals, it has been observed that response time 
decreases when the dot is preceded by an emotionally 
loaded picture with the same location. In other words, it 
may be the case that emotionally loaded images selectively 
draw attention, which facilitates response if the dot 
emerges in the same location as the picture (Bradley, 
Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998).
It appears that individuals with elevated anxiety 
attend to emotionally loaded or threat related stimuli 
more readily.than to neutral ones compared to individuals 
with normal anxiety level. Anew line of research, however, 
suggests that there may be some evolutionary component in 
the way we chose which stimuli to process and which to 
ignore. With a version of the dot probe task, Lipp and 
Derakshan (2005), tested the idea that attention bias may 
be observed among a sample of individuals without anxiety 
problems when pictures of fear-relevant animals are 
presented. Pictures of snakes and spiders were 
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distinguished as "phylogenetically prepared stimuli" and 
as such were to produce attentional bias in individuals 
who did not report a history of snake or spider phobia. 
The results of this investigation suggest that this in 
fact is the case. Attentional bias toward the fear-related 
pictures was observed across the entire sample. An 
important implication here is the fact that preferential 
processing of fear related stimuli inflates the observed 
attentional bias. For other anxiety related stimuli, 
however, the effect may be underreported. Thus, although 
widely researched, attention bias in individuals with high 
levels of anxiety emerges to be a controversial 
phenomenon.
Information Processing Bias
The effective interaction with one's immediate 
environment requires not only successfully allocating 
attention to relevant stimuli, but also filtering out 
those that are unimportant. Logically, it seems to be the 
case that by preventing such information from processing, 
more cognitive resources are being directed to relevant 
stimuli, ensuring more efficient performance. In the 
anxiety literature, deficiencies with inhibition are 
generally linked to individuals with high levels of 
anxiety. The specific processes that underlie this 
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phenomenon, however, seem to have escaped a 
straightforward explanation.
One venue of research studies aimed at clarifying the 
role of cognitive inhibition as a factor in maintaining 
anxiety symptoms has focused on examining specific 
cognitive biases that come about when interpreting 
ambiguous information. Since the individual is constantly 
bombarded with information from the environment, it is not 
uncommon for ambiguous stimuli to be a subject of 
interpretation. It has been suggested that elevated 
anxiety influences one's interpretation of such indistinct 
information (Richard & French, 1993). In other words, when 
it comes to uncertain input of information, individuals 
with high anxiety tend to process ambiguous information 
(events, bodily sensations, memories) in a threat favoring 
way. In an experiment performed by Clark et al. (as cited 
in McNally, 1999b), panic disorder patients were asked to 
rate ambiguous bodily sensations (e.g., heart 
palpitations) as neutral or threatening. It was revealed 
that an interpretive bias existed, where heart 
palpitations, for instance, were very often related to a 
pending heart attack and serious illness rather than a 
brief condition. These findings can also suggest that the 
individual failed to inhibit the unpleasant, fearful or 
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threatening meaning and all cognitive resource was 
directed in the direction of the negative stimulus. 
Evolutionarily, a similar strategy makes perfect sense - 
recognizing real danger among a vast array of potentially 
threatening stimuli will most definitely be an advantage. 
Overdoing it, however, can prevent the organism from 
focusing on other vital resources in the environment and 
can also create a very negative, life-threatening setting.
In a clever experiment, Wood, Mathews, and Dalgleish 
(2001) used sentences containing ambiguous words with a 
positive and negative possible meaning, to illustrate the 
idea that individuals with elevated anxiety have a 
deficiency in inhibiting negative information. The task 
consisted of presenting sentences that ended with a 
homograph (words that have identical spelling but 
different meaning), such as "At the party she had some 
punch". The meaning of the sentence was consistent with a 
positive/neutral meaning of the homograph. However, 
participants were asked to determine whether a probe word 
was either related or unrelated to the sentence. Probe 
words in the test condition were related to the negative 
meaning of the homograph, such as the word "fist" would be 
to the example sentence above. In other words, at a first 
glance the word "fist" is not related to the above 
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sentence, unless both meanings of the word "punch" are 
active (a party drink and a painful strike). With intact 
inhibition, the participant would quickly reject the word 
"fist" as being related to the sentence. The negative 
meaning of the "punch" homograph has been successfully 
inhibited. It was expected, that individuals with high 
anxiety would exhibit longer reaction times in comparison 
with individuals with normal anxiety levels, signalling 
inhibition deficits. Interestingly, this was not the case. 
Reaction times for people with anxiety were comparable to 
the ones displayed by the control participants. However, 
when working memory load during the task was increased, 
the deficiency in inhibiting the negative meaning surfaced 
and interference in reaction times was recorded (Wood, 
Mathews, & Dalgleish, 2003). These results are in 
accordance with the notion that effective inhibition 
requires the availability of cognitive recourses, such as 
working memory for instance. Because these resources are 
limited, the processes that depend on them compete for 
their allocation. One possible implication is that 
anxiety, the state of being aroused, takes up a certain 
amount of the available cognitive resource, taking away 
from processes such as attention and inhibition (Eysenk &
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Calvo, 1992). Therefore, competing processes depending on 
this resource are impaired.
The Present Investigation
The main goal of this investigation is to demonstrate 
that Braver and colleagues (Braver at al., 2001) context 
processing theory of cognitive control provides a 
parsimonious explanation of processing deficits found in 
those showing anxiety symptoms. Braver has shown that the 
execution of processes such as attention, inhibition and 
working memory can be accounted for by a single mechanism 
- the context-processing unit. Interestingly, deficits in 
the same cognitive processes (attention, inhibition and 
working memory) have been revealed in the current anxiety 
literature (Liebert & Morris, 1967; MacLeod, 1991a; Mogg & 
Marden, 1980) as common symptoms in individuals with high 
anxiety. To date, no research has been conducted to 
determine whether anxiety sufferers show increased 
deficits in context processing relative to'non-anxiety 
sufferers. In the present study, we aim to establish a 
direct link between insufficiencies in context processing 
and cognitive deficits related to anxiety symptoms and 
thus enhance the overall understanding of the underlying 
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mechanisms of the observed discrepancies in cognitive 
performance.
Participants in the present study will be selected on 
the basis of their scores on a widely used measure of 
anxiety, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Form Y (STAI, 
Spielberg, 1983). The STAI contains two scales (STAI-Y-1 
and STAI-Y-2) that are designed to measure levels of trait 
and state anxiety independently. State anxiety refers to 
an emotional arousal that an individual experiences in the 
immediate face of real or perceived danger. It is the 
normal and adaptive reaction to an urgent threat in the 
environment that is displayed by all individuals. For 
example, hearing a loud gun shot elicits a moment of 
increased heart rate, sweating, pupil dilation and worry 
in everybody. The result is that the' organism mobilizes 
its resources to react to the pending dangerous situation 
- the basic flight or fight response. Subsequently, when 
the situation is safe and the organism calms down, the 
state anxiety is eliminated. On the other hand, trait 
anxiety is defined as being a stable characteristic and is 
associated with an established individual difference 
characterized by a heightened state anxiety response. An 
individual with high trait anxiety is more likely to 
respond with an elevated state anxiety in a wide variety 
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of situations that may not necessarily represent immediate 
danger. It is normal and adaptive to react with fear and 
anxiety to a dangerous situation, but when there is no 
need for such reaction, unnecessary anxiety results in 
lasting and disruptive symptoms. Individuals with high 
trait anxiety tend to display increased levels of state 
anxiety in situations that may not be of potential threat 
or danger, thus the adaptability of the response loses its 
functionality. If an individual's level of trait anxiety 
is within a normal range, state anxiety is experienced 
only when real danger is present or an extremely stressful 
situation arises. Thus, our interest was focused on the 
relationship between trait anxiety and context processing, 
independent of state anxiety in an attempt to detect a 
stable effect that persist whether in threatening or 
non-threatening situation.
The STAI-Y-2 will be used to establish the basis for 
the selection of individuals with high and low trait 
anxiety. Thus, participants will be divided into high and 
low anxiety groups based solely on their trait anxiety 
scores. Levels of state anxiety, however, must be taken 
into consideration as well. The reasoning behind this 
concern is that individuals with high trait anxiety tend 
to experience elevated state anxiety as well. This is true 
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for a wide variety of situations that can be threatening 
or not, novel or familiar. Thus, it is possible that 
individuals in the HA group will not only possess greater 
levels of trait anxiety than individuals the LA group, but 
greater levels of state anxiety as well. As a result, any 
difference found in context processing between the HA and 
LA groups could be attributable to either increased trait 
or state anxiety. In order to help alleviate the 
potentially confounding effect of state anxiety on context 
processing performance, in the present study, state 
anxiety will be measured and treated as a covariate. By 
doing so, the relationship between trait anxiety and 
context processing can be examined while controlling for 
the effects of state anxiety.
Recall the basic premise of the AX-CPT described 
earlier in this paper. Participants are presented with 
single letters one at a time on a computer screen and are 
required to press the target key when the letter "X" is 
presented, but only if the letter "A" preceded it. The 
processes of attention and inhibition are a natural 
consequence of good context processing and are thus 
absolutely necessary for one's performance on the AX-CPT 
(Lorsbach & Reimer, in press). To illustrate this, take an 
important aspect in the design of the AX-CPT - the 
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disproportionally high rate at which the AX target trials 
appear (70%). There are two important consequences of this 
high proportion. First, an expectancy bias to the letter 
"A" is built. Participants develop high readiness to press 
the target button to the letter "A" because 70% of the 
time it is followed by the letter "X" to complete a target 
trial. Thus, attention to the letter "A" facilitates 
performance on the target AX trials. However, the same 
bias proves detrimental on AY trials where participants 
must resist pressing the target button. Further, a second 
bias toward making a target response when the probe is the 
letter "X", even with a non-A cue (BX trials) is formed. 
The concept here is similar - the high rate of AX trials 
builds an urge in participants to press target every time 
they see an "X". In the case of BX trials, one must 
successfully inhibit the urge to press target by using the 
representation of the non-target cue "B" (Lorsbach & 
Reimer, in press).
Also, performance on the AX-CPT relies on the active 
representation and maintenance of context and therefore 
provides an excellent opportunity for their examination. 
For instance, variations in the quality of context 
representation and maintenance results in predictable 
performance patterns on AY and BX trials. Details about 
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these patterns will be provided in the following 
paragraphs. Performance in the BY trials does not depend 
on either good representation or maintenance of context 
and therefore can be considered as a baseline condition.
In some of his experiments, Braver (Braver & Barch,
2002) manipulated the delay between, cue and probe by 
having a short (1 sec) and long (5 sec) delay. The 
difference between the two delays lies in the fact that in 
the long delay condition participants not only have to 
represent the cue as relevant context, they must maintain 
it during the delay. In the present investigation, we will 
adopt a long (5 sec) delay between cue and probe for all 
trials because it allows for both representation and 
maintenance of context to be examined simultaneously.
If context processing is good, individuals should be 
able to successfully inhibit the tendency to press the 
target key on BX trials and thus the error rate should be 
lower and reaction times faster in comparison with AY 
trials. On the other hand, good context processing hinders 
performance on AY trials because the large number of AX 
trails creates an expectancy bias toward pressing the 
target key when the cue is "A". Therefore, with good 
context processing, performance on AY trails leads to more 
errors and slower reaction time than performance on BX 
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trials. When context processing is impaired, the opposite 
is expected - errors and reaction times on the BX trials 
should surpass errors and reaction times on AY trials.
Thanks to the delay between cue and probe, context 
maintenance also can be examined. Therefore, if context 
maintenance is good, individuals should perform well on BX 
trials, which require active maintenance of the inhibitory 
cue "B," and should successfully inhibit the tendency to 
press the target key. Error rates on BX trials should be 
lower and reaction times faster than AY trials. On the 
other hand, good context maintenance comes at a cost in 
the AY condition. Here, the expectancy bias to press the 
target key when the cue is "A" is maintained over the 
delay and results in more errors and slower reaction times 
in comparison with the BX trials. If context maintenance 
is impaired, error rates will increase dramatically in the 
BX condition because participants will fail to inhibit the 
overwhelming tendency to press the target key when they 
encounter an "X" probe. Conversely, performance on the 
expectancy-hindered AY trials should improve. Failing to 
maintain the cue representation over a long delay lessens 
the expectancy, thus, improving performance. In short, 
with context maintenance problems, performance will 
improve on AY trials and worsen on BX trials.
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Examining context processing in individuals with 
elevated trait anxiety leads to straightforward 
predictions regarding performance on the AX-CPT. If 
context processing is impaired, individuals in the high 
anxiety group will.display fewer errors and faster 
reaction times on AY trails in comparison with individuals 
in the low anxiety group. Also, the high anxiety group 
will show impaired performance on BX trials (more errors 
and slower reaction times) in comparison with individuals 
in the low anxiety group.
A possibility exists, however, that, the effects of 
anxiety on context processing may not be displayed unless 
there is an increased level of demand on one's cognitive 
processing. Some studies suggest that unless there is a 
demand for cognitive resources, differences between high 
and low anxiety groups may be undetected. Thus, 
performance on the standard AX-CPT described above may not 
differ for the two anxiety groups. To explore this 
possibility, a high-demand version of the AX-CPT, 
subsequently referred to as Distracter task, will be used. 
In this version, a sequence of three distracter stimuli 
(letters in different color and font) will be presented 
during the delay (5 sec) between the cue and probe (See 
Figure 4). The goal of the task remains the same as in the 
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Standard AX-CPT - to identify and respond to a target 
probe "X" but only when it is preceded by a target cue 
"A". Attention, inhibition, as well as intact 
representation and maintenance of the cue are once again 
essential for the successful performance on the task. 
However, unlike the Standard AX-CPT, the high demand 
version requires participants to actively protect and keep 
the cue representation intact while being presented with 
interfering, competing stimuli. It is often thought that 
individuals who suffer from anxiety are not able to 
inhibit persistent thoughts or threatening stimuli in 
their environment and that this inability perpetuates 
their anxiety symptoms (MacLeod, 1996). It is proposed 
that individuals with high trait anxiety will have a more 
difficult time withholding their attention from the 
distracter stimuli in the Distracter condition than 
individuals with low trait anxiety. If so, this will 
negatively affect the maintenance of the cue-letter 
presented at the beginning of the trial and by the time 
the probe letter is presented context processing will be 
compromised. The role of the distracters is to challenge 
the update and maintenance components of the context 
processing mechanism.
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If context processing is good, participants will be 
able to successfully represent and maintain context 
information and respond accordingly even in the presence 
of distracting stimuli during the cue-probe delay. Good 
representation of the letter "A" should still come at a 
cost for participants on AY trials and more errors and. 
slower reaction times should be present. Good maintenance 
of the representation should also aid participants in 
resisting the urge to press the target button on BX 
trials, thus resulting in fewer errors and faster reaction 
times'. On the other hand, when context processing is 
compromised, we should observe fewer errors on AY trials 
because the initially poor representation of the letter 
"A" will worsen in the presence of distracters. In the 
case of BX trials, distracters will interfere with the 
maintenance of context representation and participants 
will experience even greater difficulty inhibiting the 
overwhelming urge to press the target button in the 
presence of distracters. This will result in an increased 
number of errors and slower reaction times in the BX 
condition.
In the high demand condition, individuals in the high 
anxiety group are expected to have particular difficulty 
because their ability to represent and maintain context 
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information, and thus exercising good attention and 
inhibition in the presence of distracters will be 
challenged. In this condition, context representation 
deficits will worsen for the high anxiety group, resulting 
in even fewer errors and faster reaction times on AY 
trials in comparison with the AY trials on the Standard 
AX-CPT. Further, context maintenance deficits will be 
amplified in the high demand condition as well.
Performance of the high anxiety group will decline on BX 
trials (greater error rate and slower reaction times) in 
comparison with their performance on BX trials on the 
Standard AX-CPT.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHODS
Participants
A total of 458 CSUSB undergraduates participated in 
the pre-screening phase of this experiment and completed 
the STAI-Y—2 scale. Taking part in the screening phase of 
the study was open to all students. Based on the first 
pre-screening sample of 153 students, STAI-Y-2 criteria 
were established. Participants scoring in the top quartile 
(M > 2.25) comprised the high anxiety group and those in 
the bottom quartile comprised the low anxiety group
(M < 1.65). These criteria were used to select individuals 
for the testing phase on all subsequent pre-screenings.
The population norm for the STAY-Y-2 scale has been 
calculated to be 32.7 (SD = 9.9). From the total of 458 
pre-screened students, 212 met the STAI-Y-2 criteria and 
were selected to be in either the low or high anxiety 
group. The remaining 246 participants were not selected to 
continue because they did not meet the test criteria. A 
total of 61 students (53 female and 8 male) participated 
in the testing phase. A total-of 29 participants (2 male 
and 27 female) and with mean age of 28.3 years (SD = 
10.37) comprised the low anxiety group and scored a mean
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of 1.38 (SD = .15) and 1.61 (SD = .22) on the STAI-Y-2 
(trait anxiety scale) and STAI-Y-1 (state anxiety scale) 
respectively. A total of 28 participants (5 male and 23 
female) with mean age of 23.7 years (SD = 5.51) comprised 
the high anxiety group and scored a mean of 2.61
(SD = .30) and 2.13 (SD = .46) on the STAI-Y-2 (trait 
anxiety scale) and STAI-Y-1 (state anxiety scale) 
respectively. Participants were native English speakers 
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The students 
participated voluntarily and were offered extra credit in 
exchange for their participation. Participants were 
treated in accordance with the "Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists and Code of Conduct" (American Psychological 
Association, 1992).
Design
The design of the present experiment was a 2 (Anxiety 
level: high vs. low) X 2- (Non-target trial type: AY vs. BX 
vs. BY) mixed factorial design with anxiety level as the 
between factor and non-target trial type as the within 
factor. Error rate and reaction time (RT) were measured 
for each participant.
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Materials
Pre-Screening Phase
Participants were given a screening questionnaire - 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y). As mentioned 
earlier, the STAI consists of two scales measuring state 
and trait anxiety.. The STAI-Y-1, measuring state anxiety, 
is composed of 20 items and they generally ask 
participants to rate their feeling of anxiety at the 
moment on a 4-point scale (1-not at all, 2-somewhat, 
3-moderately so and 4-very much so). Examples of the items 
in the scale are "I am tense" and "I am relaxed". The 
STAI-Y-2, measuring trait anxiety, is composed of 20 items 
and asks participants to rate how they feel about 
themselves in general. Examples of such items are "I feel 
satisfied with myself" and "I feel nervous and restless" 
and the rating scale is a 4-point frequency scale 
(1-almost never, 2 sometimes,' 3 often and 4-almost always 
(Spielberger, 1983) .
The first STAI scale was developed in 1970. Since 
then, its 40 different language translations have been 
used continuously in clinical practice and empirical work. 
Data from thousands of college students and hundreds of 
neuropsychiatric patients have been used in the 
establishment of the STAI scales. Since 1970, the scales
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have also undergone a number of revisions to improve their 
psychometric qualities. For example, in order to represent 
the anxiety construct better, during the last revision 
(1983), 30% of the items were replaced because they 
resembled depression more so than anxiety. Items such as 
"I feel blue" and "I cry a lot" were eliminated. Also, 
ambiguous items and items with marginal psychometric 
properties were excluded. Reliability coefficients for the 
Trait-anxiety scale are between .65 and .86. The range for 
the State-anxiety scale was .16 to .62. This lower range 
reflects the less-stable, situational nature of state 
anxiety. As evidence for construct validity, Spielberger 
(1983) presents correlations between the STAI scale and 
other measures of trait-anxiety: the Taylor Manifest 
Anxiety Scale (.80), the IPAT Anxiety Scale (.75), and the 
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (.52). Further, the 
STAI scales have high levels of internal consistency; 
Cornbach's (1951) alpha coefficients for each of the two 
scales were .90 or higher (Telch, Shermis, &, Lucas, 
1989). The correlation between the two STAI scales on a 
standardized sample of individuals has been measured to 
range between .59 and .75. The long history of use of this 
scale is proof of its excellent psychometric qualities as 
a tool to capture and measure anxiety.
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Task and Apparatus
Participants were tested on two versions of the
AX-CPT - a Standard version replicating Braver's model and 
a high-demand (distracter) version, similar to Braver's 
interference adaptation of AX-CPT. In both cases, 
participants were instructed to identify target trails and 
non-target trials. Every trial consists of a cue-probe 
sequence. In the target trials, the cue was a letter A and 
was followed by a probe that is the letter X (AX trials). 
The cue-probe sequences were presented in a pseudo-random 
order such that the target AX trials appeared at a 70% 
rate. The frequency of each of the non-target trials (BX, 
AY and BY) was at a 10% rate. The letters K and Y were 
excluded from the task because they resemble the target 
robe X and may hinder proper execution of the task. Each 
letter was presented in the center of a computer screen 
with black background. All letters were 24-point uppercase 
Times New Roman font and red in color. Each stimulus was 
presented for 300 ms on the screen and the interval 
between each cue and probe measured 4900 ms 
(inter-stimulus interval). Also, a 1000 ms interval 
separated each trial (inter-trial interval).
Participants were instructed to make their response 
by using keys on a computer keyboard. For right-handed 
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participants, making a target response was possible by 
pressing the "J" key with their index finger and a 
non-target response with the "K" key and their middle 
finger. For left-handed individuals, making a target 
response was possible by pressing the "D" key with their 
index finger and a non-target response by pressing the "S" 
key with their middle finger. Participants were allowed an 
interval of 1300 ms from the onset of the probe stimulus 
to respond. Response times slower than 1300 ms were not 
recorded and a message reading "Respond Faster" appeared 
on the computer screen to prompt participants to respond 
within the allowed time. Participants were■instructed to 
respond as accurately and as quickly as possible.
The Distracter AX-CPT differs from the 
above-described Standard version in that distracter 
letters (other than A, X, K, or Y) appear on the screen 
along with the cue and probe. Participants were instructed 
to ignore the distracter letter. There were three 
distracter stimuli appearing during the cue-probe delay 
and they were 24-point uppercase Times New Roman font and 
white in color. They appeared for 300 ms with a 1000 ms 
interval between each distracter.
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Procedure
Pre-Screening Phase
With the consent of instructors, interested students 
were asked to complete the STAI-Y-2 screening 
questionnaire during class time and to provide contact 
information (i.e., name, telephone number, and electronic 
mail address). The first sample of 153 completed STAY-Y-2 
surveys was used as the basis for creating criteria for 
the high and low anxiety groups. The top and bottom 
quartiles were selected to be the high and the low anxiety 
groups. Students of any age, sex, and race/ethnicity were 
invited to participate, as long as they met the screening 
criterion, are native English speakers and have normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Students who met the screening 
criterion were telephoned and invited to participate by 
the investigator or undergraduate research assistants.
Test Phase
Upon entering the laboratory, students were asked to 
read and sign an informed consent document notifying them 
about the purpose and procedure of the experiment. All 
participants were asked to complete the STAI-Y-1 scale as 
well. Then, participants were given instruction on how to 
proceed with the AX-CPT task. A detailed description of 
the task goals was displayed on the computer screen. The 
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testing session consisted of 5 blocks of 30 trials for 
each of the two conditions (Standard and Distracter 
AX-CPT). There were a total of 150 trials per condition 
and participants had a short break between each condition 
before they began the task again. The first block of 30 
trials were practice trials and were removed from all 
statistical analyses. Also, the condition order and block 
order were counterbalanced across all participants. All 
participants were instructed to respond as quickly but as 
accurately as possible. Upon completion of both 
conditions, participants were debriefed, thanked for their 
participation, and excused. The test phase' required 
approximately 45 min to complete.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESULTS.
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for 
relevant sample variables. As expected, the high and low 
anxiety groups differed significantly on their state 
anxiety scores, t(54) = -5.4. Also, the two anxiety groups 
differed significantly in age, t(54) = 2.028. The mean 
ages for the two groups were 28.3 and 23.7, respectively. 
Table 2 presents the mean error rates and RTs of the high 
and low anxiety groups in the target (AX) and non-target 
(AY, BX, and BY) conditions. Trials in which the RTs were 
less that 200 were assumed to be error given that 
cognitive processing followed by motor response could not 
have completed in less than 200ms. In addition, any RTs 
that were greater than 1200ms were considered outliers 
given that such responses would have fallen more than 3 
standard deviations from the grand mean. On such trials, 
it was unclear if participants were not properly following 
task instruction to respond as quickly but as accurately 
as possible.
Trials in which correct RTs were less than 200 ms or 
greater than 1200 ms, were excluded from the analysis. In 
addition, two participants from the low anxiety group and 
50
one participant from the high anxiety group were excluded 
from the analyses because they committed excessive number 
of errors. Data from the Standard and Distracter tasks 
were analyzed separately. Within each analysis, error rate 
and RT data were analyzed separately for the target trial 
(AX) and non-target trials (BY, BX, and AY). This was done 
because target and non-target trials are presented to 
participants at a different frequency rate (70% for target 
trials and 30% for all non-target trials) and require 
different response (target vs. non-target button). Only 
correct responses were included in the analyses involving 
RTs. Accuracy of performance in the target trials was 
assessed using a d'-context measure and using false alarms 
in the non-target trials. An alpha level of .05 was used 
for all statistical tests. Participants' scores on the two 
anxiety scales were significantly positively correlated, 
r = .61.
Standard Task
Target Trials
Consistent with previous research using the AX-CPT 
(e.g., Braver, Satpute, Rush, Racine, & Barch, 2005; 
Braver, Barch, Keys, et al., 2001; Cohen, Barch, Carter, & 
Servan-Schreiber, 1999; Lorsbach & Reimer, 2008; Paxton, 
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Barch, Racine, & Braver, 2007), the analysis of 
performance accuracy also examined d' context, a signal 
detection measure that is based on the proportion of 
trials in which a subject responds correctly in AX trials 
by pressing the "Yes" key (Hits), relative to the 
proportion of trials in which the subject responds 
incorrectly in the BX condition by pressing the "Yes" key 
(False Alarms). Because d' context is computed using only 
BX false alarms, and not all types of false alarms (i.e., 
AY, BX, and BY), it is considered to provide a specific 
estimate of sensitivity to context (Cohen et al., 1999). 
That is to say, d' context provides a measure of one's 
ability to use prior context (A or non-A) to differentiate 
target and non-target responses to the letter X. Before 
calculating d' scores, the hit and false alarm rates were 
corrected by adding .5 to each frequency and dividing by 
N + 1, where N equals the number of old or new trials 
(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). The low (M = 3.60) and high 
(M = 3.34) anxiety groups produced statistically 
comparable d' context scores, t(55) = 1.289. This was also 
the case when the covariate (state anxiety measured by 
STAI-Y-1) was included in the analysis, F(l,54) = .031, 
MSE = .574.
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Error rates and RTs for target AX trials were also 
analyzed for both groups. There was no significant mean 
difference in error rates on the target (AX) trials among 
the high (M = 6.6%) and low (M = 2.7%) anxiety groups, 
t(55) = 1.260. Similarly, the mean RTs for the low 
(M = 528 ms) and high (M = 511 ms) groups did not differ 
significantly, |t| < 1. Thus, the high and lbw anxiety 
groups were comparable in terms of their error rates and 
RTs on target trials. Similarly, when the covariate was 
analyzed, no differences in error rates, F(l,54) = .130, 
MSE = 0.013, and RTs, F(l,54) = 1.59, MSE = 9549.03, were 
detected among the two groups.
Non-Target Trials
Non-target error rates and RTs were submitted 
separately to a 2 (Anxiety group: low vs. high) x 
3 (Non-target trial type: AY vs. BX vs. BY) mixed design 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with non-target trial type 
as the within-subject factor (see Figures 8 & 9) . For 
error rates, there was a marginally significant main 
effect of anxiety group, F(l,55) = 2.885, MSE = 0.006, 
p = .095, and a significant main effect of non-target 
trial type, F(2,110) = 15.755, MSE = 0.005. For the main 
effect of trial type, post hoc comparisons revealed that 
participants committed more errors on the AY trials
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(M = 8.6%) than BX (M = 2.9%) and BY (M = 1.3%) trials.
However, mean error rates were not significantly different 
on BX (M = 2.9%) and BY (M = 1.3% trials. The interaction 
between anxiety group and trial type was not significant, 
F < 1. When the covariate was included in the analysis, 
the effects weakened. Specifically, there was no 
significant main effect of anxiety group, F(l,54) = 1.877, 
MSE = 0.007, and only a marginally significant main effect 
of non-target trial type, F(2,108) = 2.979, p = .055. The 
interaction between anxiety group and trial type was not 
significant, F(2,108) = 1.617, MSE = 0.005
With the RT data, the main effect of anxiety group 
was not significant, F(l,55) = .021, MSE = 41741.29. 
However, there was a significant main effect of trial 
type, F(2,110) = 117.386, MSE = 4634.21. Post hoc 
comparisons revealed that RTs were significantly slower on 
AY (M = 649 ms) than BX (M = 493 ms) trials, which were in 
turn significantly slower than BY (M = 469 ms) trials. 
Finally, the trial type by anxiety group interaction, 
F < 1, was not significant. Results for the RT data when 
the covariate was included were identical.
Performance on AY .and BX trials is of crucial 
importance for the interpretation of participant's ability 
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to process context effectively. If there are deficits in 
context processing, individuals perform worse on BX trials 
(more errors and slower RTs) than AY trials (fewer errors 
and faster RTs). Therefore, planned comparisons were 
conducted to examine whether error rates and RTs differed 
on AY and BX trials separately for low and high anxiety 
groups. With the low anxiety group, participants were 
significantly slower on AY (M = 656 ms) than BX (M = 488 
ms) trials, F(l,28) = 59.922, MSE - 6818.49. In addition, 
error rates associated with AY trials (M = 6.7%) were 
greater than error rates associated with BX trials 
(M = 2.9%) and this difference approached significance, 
F(l,28) = 3.718, MSE = 0.0006, p = .064. The results with 
the inclusion of the covariate indicate that both effects 
(RTs and error rates) were not significant. As with the 
low anxiety group, participants in the high anxiety group 
also produced significantly slower RTs on the AY (M = 643 
ms) than the BX (M = 499 ms) trials, F(l,27) = 34.675, 
MSE = 8361.75. Similarly, error rates associated with AY 
(M = 10.5%) were significantly greater than the error 
rates associated with BX (M = 3.1%) trials,
F(l,27) = 8.661, MSE = 0.009. This effect was not present 
in the covariate analysis. However, the RT main effects 
remained significant indicating that even when the 
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covariate was included in the analysis, participants in 
the high anxiety were slower on the AY {M = 643) trials in 
comparison with the BX (M = 499) trials, F(l,26) = 14.230, 
MSE = 7221.82.
Distracter Task
Target Trials
Identical to the analysis in the Standard task, 
context sensitivity was again assessed in the Distracter 
test data by using d' context analysis. In contrast to the 
Standard task data, in the Distracter task, low anxiety 
participants produced significantly larger d' context 
scores than high anxiety participants, Ms = 3,73 and 3.25 
respectively, t(55) = 3.096. When the covariate was 
included, the results mirrored the direction of the above 
pattern. However, the difference in context scores between 
the two groups only approached significance at
F(l,54) = 3.546, p = .065.
There was no significant mean difference in error 
rates on target (AX) trials among the high (M = 2.5%) and 
low (M = 1.5%) anxiety groups, t(55) = 1.270. However, 
participants in the low anxiety group (M = 537 ms) 
produced slower RTs than did their high anxiety 
counterparts (M = 486 ms), and this.comparison approached 
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statistical significance, t(55) = 1.751, p = .086 (see 
Figures 10 & 11). When the covariate was included in the 
analysis, no significant mean differences were found for 
both error rates, F <1, and RTs, F(l,54) = 1.327, 
MSE = 14.517.
Non-Target Trials
As with the Standard task set of analyses, non-target 
error rates and RTs from the Distracter task were 
submitted separately to a 2 (Anxiety group: low vs. high) 
x 3 (Non-target trial type: AY vs. BX vs. BY) mixed design 
ANOVA, with non-target trial type as the within-subject 
factor. With the error rate data, the main effect of 
anxiety group was not significant, F(l,55) = 2.455, 
MSE = 0.012, however, there was a significant main effect 
of non-target trial type, F(2,110) = 20.475, MSE = 0.009. 
Post hoc comparisons indicated that error rates on the AY 
(M = 11.4%) trials were greater than those on the BX 
(M = 5.4%) trials, which were in turn greater than those 
on the BY (M = 0.4%) trials. However, this main effect was 
qualified by the presence of a marginally significant 
non-target trial type by anxiety group interaction, 
F(2,110) = 2.773, p = .067 (see Table 1 for means). 
Results for the error rates when the covariate was 
included were comparable.
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With the RT data, the main effect of anxiety group 
was not significant, F(l,55) = 2.196, MSE = 36404.54. 
However, the main effect of non-target trial type was 
significant, F (2,110) = 170.619, MSE = 3676.69. Post hoc 
comparisons revealed that RTs were slower on AY (M = 658 
ms) than BX (M = 459 ms) trials, which were in turn slower 
than BY (M = 499 ms) trials. Finally, as with the error 
rate data the non-target trial type by anxiety group 
interaction approached significance, F(2,110) = 2.981, 
p = .055. Results for the error rates when the covariate 
was included were comparable.
Recall that AY and BX trials are of great importance 
when context processing is interpreted. Therefore, planned 
comparisons were again conducted to examine whether- error 
rates and RTs differed on AY and BX trials separately for 
low and high anxiety groups. With the low anxiety group, 
participants were significantly slower on AY (M = 669 ms) 
than BX (M = 497 ms) trials, F(l,28) = 126.97, 
MSE = 3385.39, p < .001 .In addition, error rates 
associated with AY trials (M = 11.1%) were significantly 
greater than error rates associated with BX trials 
(M = 1.8%) , F(l,28) = 14.704, MSE = .009 , p < .00'1. The 
effects in RTs remained even after the covariate was ■ 
included, F(l,27) = 18.927, MSE = 3038.11, p < .001. The 
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effect in error rates was marginally significant, 
F(l,27) = 3.994, MSE = .008, p = .056.
As with, the low anxiety group, participants in the 
high anxiety group also produced significantly slower RTs 
on the AY (M = 647 ms) than the BX (M = 422 ms) trials, 
F(l,27) = 149.14, MSE = -4741.13, p < .001. However, unlike 
the low anxiety group, in the high anxiety group, error 
rates associated with AY (M = 11.7%) trials did not 
statistically differ from the error rates associated with 
BX (M = 9.1%) trials, F < 1. With the covariate, the 
results for the high anxiety group were similar. . 
Specifically, there was no effect of error rate and the 
effect of RTs remained, as AY RTs were slower than those 
in BX, F(l,26) = 11.94, MSE = 4871.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION
The goal of the present study was to apply an 
existing model of cognitive control to a new population - 
individuals with elevated anxiety. By doing so, we hoped 
to demonstrate that attention and inhibition deficits 
experienced by individuals with high anxiety are related 
to deficits in context processing. Recall that the basic 
premise of Braver's model is that context processing 
relies on the successful representation and maintenance of 
context information. The process of representation allows 
context to be used to direct behavior and resist 
interference and the process of maintenance allows this 
context information to be stored over time within working 
memory. In AX-CPT, context information is provided by the 
cue, which guides the appropriate response to the probe 
(target or non-target). The high frequency of target AX 
trials (70%), results in tendency to press target to the 
probe X, regardless of the cue (BX trials) and to press 
target to the cue A, regardless of the probe (AY trials). 
The expectancy bias to the letter "A" facilitates 
performance on the target AX trials but hinders it on the 
non-target AY trials. Here, participants with good context 
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processing are able to represent the cue A successfully 
and therefore cannot resist the urge to press target in 
the instances where the probe is a Y (non-target AY) 
instead of an X (target AX). Thus, good context processing 
results in poor accuracy and slower RTs on AY trials. The 
high frequency of AX trials creates a bias affecting 
performance on BX trials as well. The expectancy bias to 
the letter "X" creates a tendency for a target response to 
the probe "X", regardless of the cue. On BX trials, 
individuals with good context processing are able to use 
context information from the non-target cue "B" and 
effectively inhibit their inclination to press target. 
Good context processing results in fast and accurate 
responses on BX trails. Generally, individuals with poor 
context processing do not represent cue information well 
and, thus, are not able to inhibit the biased target 
response and display more BX than AY errors.
Target trial (AX) error rates and RTs for the 
Standard task were comparable for the two anxiety groups, 
when STAI scores were not included as a covariate. 
Specifically, both groups were fast and accurate in 
identifying AX trials as target trials. This comes to 
indicate that group differences in trait anxiety did not 
interfere with individuals' ability to use context in the 
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AX trials. Further, analysis of the d' context scores 
indicated that both anxiety groups were equally sensitive 
to using prior context information. Thus, the valid (A) 
and non-valid (non-A) cues were used to successfully guide 
context equally with both groups. That is to say, anxiety 
did not interfere with participant's ability to 
distinguish between AX and BX trials. -
The pattern of results on non-target trials for the 
Standard task is consistent with the analyses of target 
trials. Specifically, of the two main effects, anxiety 
group and trial type, only the latter one was significant. 
Trait anxiety did not interfere with participants' ability 
to represent and use context and therefore both groups 
performed comparably. Participants displayed the signature 
pattern of good context processing, where responses on AY 
trials were slower and less accurate in comparison with 
performance on BX trials (see Figure 8 & 9). Thus, despite 
anxiety group differences, all participants were able to 
represent and use context information successfully. 
Comparable error rates and RTs in the AY vs. BX conditions 
for each group indicate that due to the high frequency 
target AX trials 1) participants formed strong expectancy 
bias toward the cue A and falsely identified even 
non-target trials containing the cue A, such as AY, as 
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target trials and 2) participants formed strong expectancy 
bias toward the probe X but used context provided by the 
non-target cue B to overcome it and successfully 
identified'BX trials as non-target ones. More accurate and 
fast performance on BX trials in comparison with AY 
trials, across both groups, signals good context 
processing despite anxiety differences. Further supporting 
this conclusion, planned comparisons revealed nearly 
identical pattern of performance for each group. There 
were significantly more errors and' slower RTs^ in the AY 
condition in comparison with the BX condition, and this 
was the case for each anxiety group. Once again, pattern 
of good context processing was evident.
In addition, the Standard task used a long (5 s) 
cue-probe delay, which in Braver's studies, is used to 
test one's ability to maintain context representation over 
time in working memory.. Thus, the cue must not'only be 
represented, but also actively maintained in working 
memory over the delay. The performance on AY and BX trials 
observed in our experiment (faster and more accurate BX 
than AY) is evidence for good maintenance of context by 
both anxiety groups. All participants, regardless of their 
anxiety level, were able to both form a context 
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representation and maintain this representation in working 
memory.
In summary, recall that in Braver's signature pattern 
of good context processing there are greater AY errors and 
slower RTs than errors and RTs associated with BX trials 
(see Figure 2). Using the two biases created by the high 
frequency AX trials, context improves performance in the 
BX trials and hinders performance in the AY trials. The 
lack of group difference in the Standard task was 
unanticipated. Initially, we expected that trait anxiety 
would affect performance on the AX-CPT differentially, 
hindering the high anxiety group. In the present 
experiment, we find no evidence for anxiety interference 
on context processing. At the level of the low demand 
Standard task, both anxiety groups were able to use 
context information successfully.
This finding, although unexpected, is particularly ■ 
noteworthy because individuals with high anxiety are known 
to display cognitive deficits in attention and inhibition 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Kane & Engle, 2003).
According to Braver (Braver & Barch, 2002), the 
context-processing unit is vital not only in attention and 
inhibition, but also in processes dependent on cognitive 
control in working memory. The second, Distracter task, 
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used in this experiment was designed to increase cognitive 
demand (i.e., working memory capacity) during the AX-CPT. 
Recall from earlier discussion that the Distracter task 
differed from the Standard task only in one aspect - three 
distracter letters appeared during the cue-probe delay 
(Figure 4). The purpose of this manipulation was to test 
context processing performance in a condition of increased 
cognitive demand. Based on analysis excluding the 
covariate, the results from the Distracter task provided 
evidence supporting the overall hypothesis that 
individuals with high and low anxiety differ in their 
ability to use context under conditions of high cognitive 
demand.
In the Distracter task, target trial (AX) error rates 
and RTs were comparable for the two anxiety groups, when 
STAI scores- were not included as a covariate. Both groups 
were fast and accurate in identifying AX trials as target 
trials, which indicates some initial level of good context 
processing. However, in contrast to the Standard task 
data, in the Distracter task, low anxiety participants 
produced significantly larger d' context scores than high, 
anxiety participants. The larger d' scores of low anxiety 
participants indicate that they were, relative to high 
anxiety participants, more proficient at using prior 
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context information in their attempt to distinguish 
targets and non-targets. That is to say, the group 
differences in d' context scores indicate that when 
presented with an X probe, participants in the low group 
were more sensitive to the preceding context (i.e., A or 
non-A) than participants in the high group.
Overall analysis of non-target trials painted picture 
similar to the one in the low demand, Standard task where 
we found a robust main effect of trial type but no effect 
of anxiety on performance. However, the marginally 
significant trial type by anxiety group interaction 
demanded that planned comparisons for each group are 
examined independently. These comparisons revealed that 
the low anxiety group performed comparably on both tasks 
(Standard and Distracter) by displaying the signature 
pattern of good context processing. Specifically, error 
rate was higher and- RTs were slower in the AY condition 
compared to the BX condition. Participants in the low 
anxiety groups used context successfully to overcome the 
bias to press target in BX trials and identified BX as 
non-target trials fast and accurate. Thus, inhibitory 
response on BX trials was effective. The low anxiety group 
was able to use context information from the non-target B 
cue and successfully override the tendency to press target 
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when the probe X is presented. Also, the increased number 
of AY errors indicates that low anxiety participants were 
able to represent context well and form the strong 
expectancy bias toward the cue letter A and therefore were 
slower and less accurate than in the BX condition. 
Remarkably, this pattern of good context processing 
persisted in the presence of the distracter letters. They 
did not interfere with low anxiety participants' ability 
to actively maintain context representation even under 
condition of increased demand on working memory.
The high anxiety group, however, performed 
differently on non-target trials than the low anxiety 
group in the Distracter task. While displaying good 
context processing in the Standard task, participants with 
high trait anxiety were challenged in the high demand task 
and displayed a pattern of error rates and RTs 
characteristic of poor context processing. Specifically, 
error rates and RTs on the non-target AY and BX trials 
were comparable. As pointed out earlier, the successful 
use of context improves performance in the BX trials and 
hinders performance in the AY trials. In the case of the 
high anxiety group, however, during the Distracter task 
performance was hindered in both, the AY and the BX 
condition.
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This comes to say that trait anxiety had no influence 
on participants' ability to process context successfully 
unless conditions of high cognitive demand were present. 
In fact, the low anxiety group was able to use context 
effectively and show the signature pattern of good context 
processing despite distracter interference. The predicted 
differences were revealed only when the high anxiety group 
failed to maintain context in the presence of distracters. 
Recall that good performance on an AX-CPT with a long 
delay between cue and probe requires active context 
maintenance. In the present experiment, both tasks
(Standard and Distracter) had a long (5sec) delay and thus 
provided, context maintenance assessment. This assessment 
indicates that context maintenance was good for both 
groups during the Standard task; specifically, high and 
low anxiety groups were able to hold the cue information 
in working memory over the 5sec delay and use it 
effectively to guide probe responses. Further, this type 
of performance persisted for the low anxiety group in the 
Distracter task, where interfering stimuli were displayed 
during the 5sec delay. Participants in the low anxiety 
group were able to overcome the possible negative effect 
of distracters and despite the increased demand on working 
memory were still able to use context effectively. As 
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revealed by the pattern of performance, this was not the 
case with the high anxiety group. The presence of 
distracters compromised their ability to effectively 
maintain cue context in working memory and when faced with 
the decision to respond to a probe "X" with target or 
non-target, high anxiety participants were unable to 
resist the urge to press target. Their performance during 
the Distracter task had comparable error rates and RTs for 
both AY and BX trial types, instead of more errors and 
slower RTs in AY in comparison with BX condition. 
Therefore, the present study does provide indication of 
existing group differences in context processing, but only 
under condition of increased cognitive demand. Recall that 
both tasks had a long delay between cue and probe 
presentation, which somewhat increases cognitive demand in 
comparison with a short delay AX-CPT and reguires active 
maintenance of context within working memory. In the 
Standard task, anxiety did not interfere with context 
maintenance. However, in the presence of distracters, the 
high anxiety participants experienced great difficulty to 
actively maintain and protect context. The difference 
between the two groups must be attributed to processes 
related to the resistance-of-interference component of 
context maintenance.
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As discussed earlier, accounts of the detrimental 
effect of anxiety on some cognitive processes have a long 
history in the empirical literature (Liebert & Morris, 
1967; MacLeod, 1991a; Mogg & Marden, 1980). Anxiety or 
being occupied with worrisome thoughts, is considered to 
interfere with one's ability to attend and process task 
relevant information and thus results in performance 
deficits on the task overall. Recall that numerous studies 
have attempted to describe and explain cognitive deficits 
in attention and inhibition (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Kane 
& Engle, 2003; MacLeod, 1991a) as well as working memory 
(MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993) that individuals with high 
anxiety seem to display on a consistent basis. Despite the 
abundance of such studies, a straightforward and 
parsimonious explanation of the origin of anxiety-related 
cognitive deficits was lacking. The main goal of this 
investigation was to set a unitary framework where 
attention, inhibition and working memory are the results 
of a single mechanism, the context processing mechanism. 
This approach would allow for assessment of all three 
common cognitive deficits to be tested simultaneously. If 
deficits were detected, they would be ultimately 
associated with context processing, a mechanism that is 
grounded in neurobiology and is tested via task that 
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allows for its three main components (attention, 
inhibition an working memory) to be assessed concurrently 
and independently. Moreover, the purpose of having two 
versions of the AX-CPT task, Standard and Distracter, was 
to differentiate between situations with normal and high 
cognitive demand. The reasoning here was that it is 
possible that the effects of anxiety on context processing 
may not be displayed unless there is an increased level of 
demand on one's cognitive processing. Thus, even if 
context processing was comparable for both groups in the 
Standard task, we predicted that differences would arise 
during the high demand Distracter task and the high 
anxiety group will show performance deficits 
characteristic of poor context processing. The results of 
this investigation provide evidence to support this 
notion.
A theory set forth by Eysenc and Calvo (1992) 
proposes that processing efficiency accounts for 
performance deficits associated with anxiety. This theory 
suggests that elevated anxiety hinders performance on 
tasks that rely on some involvement of working memory. 
This is the case because the anxiety and anxious thoughts 
these individuals experience take some processing 
resources away from the actual task at hand (Richards,
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French, Keogh, & Carter, 2000). Similarly, the Distracter 
task used in the current investigation placed a heavier 
demand on resources used within working memory - 
participants had to hold and protect the representation of 
context and the goal of the task in working memory during 
a 5 second delay and in the presence of distracter 
stimuli. When interfering stimuli were not present 
(Standard task), both groups performed well and showed 
good context processing, even with a long 5-second delay. 
In the Distracter task, however, the high anxiety group 
failed to protect context in the presence of distracter 
and showed poor context processing.
Interestingly, when scores from the STAI-Y-1 (state 
anxiety scale) state were included in the analyses as a 
covariate, the effects described above were generally 
weaker, and, in some cases, disappeared. This indicates 
that although differences in context processing appear to 
be associated with high anxiety, it is unclear whether 
they are due to trait, state or of the effects of both 
types of anxiety. The groups in the present investigation 
were based on stable, personality differences in trait 
anxiety and although evidence of their association with 
deficits in context processing was found, state anxiety 
appears to play a role as well-. Consistent with literature 
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using state and trait anxiety measures, scores on both 
scales in this investigation were significantly positively 
correlated (.61). In the spirit of this relationship, 
individuals with high trait anxiety are also likely to 
display heightened sensitivity to anxiety provoking 
situation and thus display elevated state anxiety scores. 
It is possible that participants treated the novel lab 
environment where they were tested and where they 
completed the state anxiety questionnaire, as one 
provoking anxiety. Thus, it is impossible to disentangle 
the relationship between state and trait' anxiety to a 
degree to which their unique effect on context processing 
can be determined. Also, it is possible that the 
relationship between trait anxiety and context processing 
is partially mediated by state anxiety.
Limitations
It is important to note that the current 
investigation is the first of its kind to test the context 
processing model of cognitive control on individuals with 
high and low anxiety, and therefore has some reasonable 
limitations. Specifically, although a large number of 
potential participants were pre-screened (458), less than 
half (212) qualified by meeting the screening criteria. Of 
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this number, an even smaller fraction (61) participated in 
the lab portion of the study. Therefore, the small sample 
may bear some responsibility on the effects that were only 
marginally significant. With a larger sample, these 
effects, which are in the expected direction, can be 
anticipated to be significantly so. Also, the STAI-Y-2 
(trait anxiety scale) cut-off score for the high and low 
group was based on the top and bottom quartiles of the 
first pre-screening group of 153 students. It was 
anticipated that this sample would be sufficient for the 
selection of all participants needed for the experiment. 
As pointed out earlier, however, fewer than expected 
numbers of students answered the call to come into the lab 
and complete the AX-CPT session. Therefore, the need for 
subsequent pre-screening arose. The cutoff scores 
established from the first sample of 15 students for the 
high and low anxiety groups were used in the subsequent 
screenings. It is possible that these cut-off scores were 
not discriminative enough. Specifically, compared to the 
norm score for the STAY-Y-2 scale (32.7), the low anxiety 
group scores were 27.6, which is close but not quite one 
standard deviation (9.9) below the normative score. The 
mean score for the high anxiety group score was 56, which 
is well above one standard deviation from the norm. Thus,
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the cutoff score for the low anxiety group should have 
been set at least one standard deviation below the norm. 
Further, it has been reported than men tend to underreport 
on the STAI-Y-2 scale and therefore separate cutoff scores' 
for the male and female participants should have been 
established. Since both genders were considered at the 
same time, the lower scores of., the male participants may 
have caused a lower overall mean for trait anxiety. The 
effect of differential reporting may have been 
particularly problematic given the fact that there were 
more male in the high group (5) than in the low group (2). 
Future studies may consider using more stringent and 
consistent criteria for selecting high and low anxiety 
participants, as well as selecting from a male and female 
sample independently. Another possible limitation 
regarding the STAI-Y-2 scale is that participants 
completed the scale only at pre-screening. It is possible 
that some participants' (in both the low and the high 
anxiety group) score would have regressed toward the mean 
for the STAI-Y-2. If participants had to take the scale as 
part of the lab session, a more precise measure of trait 
anxiety could have been obtained. Only participants who 
scored consistently above or below the STAI-Y-2 mean could 
have been selected for the experiment. It is possible that 
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the lack of significant anxiety effects in the Standard 
task is due to the diluted trait anxiety scores.
In regards to the AX-CPT itself, some alterations may 
be beneficial. The first block of trials in the current 
study was not included in the investigation because it was 
used as a demonstration for the participants. This led to
r
only four complete blocks of trials per task be included 
in the final analysis. Further, although Braver's ratio of 
70% target (AX) and 30% non-target (BY, BX, and AY) trials 
in the AX-CPT was unchanged, the total number of trials 
was slightly reduced in order to shorten the total 
duration of the experimental session. Ideally, 
participants would be invited to participate in two 
experimental sessions, one for the Standard and another 
for the Distracter task. Although the order of AX-CPT 
versions was completely randomized for all participants, 
there may be some interference associated with 
participants' level of fatigue. The AX-CPT is a monotonous 
task that requires participants to be continuously 
attentive and motivated to respond as quickly but as 
accurately as possible. If participants take each AX-CPT 
version at a different time, they could be exposed to a 
larger overall number of trials in a shorter amount of 
time, which will remove some of the fatigue related error.
It is worth noting that the two groups were 
significantly different in age. The low anxiety group was 
comprised of participants that were older than the 
participants in the high anxiety group. Although there is 
no theoretical reason to expect differences in context 
processing in a sample if healthy young adults, such 
difference was detected. Interestingly, individuals in the 
low anxiety group displayed good context processing on 
both tasks, while, participants in the younger, high 
anxiety group displayed poor context processing on the 
Distracter task. Thus, although an unexpected difference 
was detected, it was in direction opposite of possible 
theoretical expectations. Last, the design of the present 
investigation does not allow of the independent effect of 
state and trait anxiety on context processing to be 
examined precisely. Participants were selected on their 
score on the STAI-Y-2 (trait anxiety) scale and their 
state anxiety was merely assessed at the time of testing. 
Future experimental designs may include a state anxiety 
manipulation on a randomly selected population to identify 
how anxiety that stems from the situation itself, can be 
affecting context processing.
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Implications
Readers must keep in mind that the present study is 
the first in associating anxiety and context processing 
deficits. However, the results of this study, although 
interpreted with caution, are important in providing a 
research framework for investigating anxiety symptoms and 
their relation to attention, inhibition and working 
memory. Moreover, these results are especially important 
for the anxiety literature because it has examined anxiety 
related cognitive deficits one dimensionally. The present 
investigation provides evidence of a single underlying 
mechanism (context processing) that can explain multiple 
cognitive deficits concurrently. Such unitary explanation 
is simpler and more integrative in accounting for 
cognitive deficits.
In addition to contributing to our understanding of 
the effects of anxiety on cognitive control, although the 
present study was not designed to examine cognitive 
control in the workplace, it may have implications for the 
workplace. The workplace provides situations high in 
stress and/or task complexity that are analogous of the 
situations created in this experiment. Therefore, we may 
speculate that in conditions of low cognitive demand or 
low demand on working memory capacity, as in the Standard 
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task, differences in anxiety will not interfere with task 
performance.. Individuals with high trait anxiety in entry 
level positions or ones with more basic and routine task 
load, may not experience any deficits based on their 
personality characteristic. Most workplaces, however, are 
dynamic, stress provoking, and filled with tasks and 
demands that are rarely predictable and stable. This is 
especially the case in middle and high-level positions. 
Recall that in such high demand situations, participants 
in the high anxiety group experienced deficits in 
cognitive control and performed worse than individuals in 
the low anxiety group. The implication for these 
individuals in the workplace is that as demand and 
complexity of tasks increase, performance deficits will 
begin to surface.
Therefore, stable individual differences in trait 
anxiety can be a predictor of job performance and 
promotion rate. An employee with high trait anxiety can 
perform successfully in an entry-level position, where 
most tasks are predictable and routine, and close 
supervision and one-on-one training are available. 
However, in mid- and high-level positions, complexity and 
ambiguity in daily tasks increase dramatically. Employees 
with high trait anxiety who have worked successfully in an 
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entry-level position will be exposed to work situations 
that resemble the Distracter version of our task. They 
will be required to hold more information in working
♦memory, have higher interruption rate and will have to be 
effective in selecting what information is relevant and 
needs their attention and what information is irrelevant 
and distractive. Individuals with high trait anxiety may 
fail to perform at higher-level positions or in 
occupations where one must withstand the presence of 
distracters. Thus, it is possible that employees with high 
trait anxiety have difficulties promoting into mid- and 
high-level positions.
80
APPENDIX A
TABLES
81
Age Trait Anxiety State Anxiety
Table 1 Means and standard deviations for relevant sample variables
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Low Anxiety 28.3 10.4 1.38 0.15 1.61 0.23
Group
High Anxiety 23.7 5.5 2.61 0.3 2.13 0.46
Group
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Error Rates RTs
Table 2. Mean error rates and RTs of high and low anxiety groups in 
target (AX) and non-target (AY, BX, and BY) conditions
AX AY BX BY AX AY BX BY
Standard Low Mean 2.3 6.7 2.7 0.3 529 656 488 475
Task SD 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.01 91 103 145 114
High Mean 0.1 10.5 3.1 2.4 512 643 499 463
SD 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 105 106 176 124
Distracter Low Mean 1.5 11.1 1.8 0.3 537 669 497 516
Task SD 0.1- 0.1 0.1 0.01 113 128 124 131
High Mean 2.5 11.7 9.1 0.4 487 647 422 483
SD 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.02 103 123 108 108
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Active Memory
Figure Captions
Figure 1. Braver’s canonical model (PFC - prefrontal cortex, DA - dopamine)
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Trial Type
Figure 2. Context Processing Signature Pattern - Standard AX- CPT
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Time
Figure 3. AX-CPT - Task Presentation
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Standard AX-CPT: A..............................X.......B...
Distracter AX - CPT: A.... D.....E.....K.....X...... B....
Figure 4. Two task conditions - Standard and Distracter AX-CPT
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Trial Type
Figure 5. Expected Performance on the High Demand AX-CPT
■ 89
Trial Type
Figure 6. High and Low Anxiety Groups Performing on the Standard AX-CPT
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Trial Type
Figure 7. High and Low Anxiety groups performing on the high demand AX-CPT
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Figure 8. Standard Task: Error rate performance of low and high anxiety groups each 
of the target and non-target trial types. Error bars reflect standard errors of the means.
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Figure 9. Standard Task: RT performance of low and high anxiety groups each of the 
target and non-target trial types. Error bars reflect standard errors of the means.
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Figure 10. Distracter Task: Error rate performance of low and high anxiety groups 
each of the target and non-target trial types. Error bars reflect standard errors of the 
means.
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Figure 11. Distracter Task: Performance of low and high anxiety groups each of the 
target and non-target trial types. Error bars reflect standard errors of the means.
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STAI-Y-1 Scale measuring state anxiety
STAI-FORMY-1
DATE: AGE: GENDER:
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and circle the number on the scale below to indicate how you feel right 
now, that is, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any 
one statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
# Statement
NOTAT 
ALL SOMEWHAT
MODERATELY 
SO
VERY MUCH 
SO
1 I feel calm 1 2 3 4
2 I feel secure 1 2 3 4
3 I am tense 1 2 3 4
4 I feel strained 1 2 3 4
5 I feel at ease 1 2 3 4
6 I feel upset 1 2 3 4
7
I am presently worried over 
possible misfortunes
1 2 3 4
8 I feel satisfied 1 2 3 4
9 I feel frightened 1 2 3 4
10 I feel comfortable 1 2 3 4
11 I feel self-confident 1 2 3 4
12 I feel nervous 1 2 3 4
13 I am jittery 1 2 3 4
14 I feel indecisive 1 2 3 4
15 I am relaxed 1 2 3 4
16 I feel content 1 2 3 4
17 I am worried 1 2 3 4
18 I feel confused 1 2 3 4
19 I feel steady 1 2 3 4
20 I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4
STAI-Y-2 scale measuring trait anxiety.
STAI-FORMY-2
DATE: AGE: GENDER:
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and circle the number on the scale below to indicate how you feel generally 
feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give 
the answer which seems to describe how you generally feel. 
# Statement ALMOST NEVER SOMETIMES OFTEN
ALMOST 
ALWAYS
21 I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4
22 I feel nervous and restless 1 2 3 4
23 I feel satisfied with myself 1 2 3 4
24
I wish I could be as happy as others seem to 
be
1 2 3 4
25 I feel like a failure 1 2 3 4
26 I feel rested 1 2 3 4
27 I am "calm, cool and collected" 1 2 3 4
28
I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I 
cannot overcome them
1 2 3 4
29
I worry too much over something that really 
doesn't matter
1 2 3 4
30 I am happy 1 2 3 4
31 I have disturbing thoughts 1 2 3 4
32 I lack self-confidence 1 2 3 4
33 I feel secure 1 2 3 4
34 I make decisions easily 1 2 3 4
35 I feel inadequate 1 2 3 4
36 I am content 1 2 3 4
37
Some unimportant thought runs through my 
mind and bothers me
1 2 3 4
38
I take disappointments so keenly that I can't 
put them out of my mind
1 2 3 4
39 I am steady person 1 2 3 4
40
I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I 
think over me recent concerns and interests
1 2 3 4
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INFORMED CONSENT
STAI - Prescreening
You are invited to participate in a study designed to investigate cognitive processing. 
This study is being conducted by Viara Stankova under the supervision of Dr. Jason 
Reimer, Professor of Psychology. This study has been approved by the Department of 
Psychology Institutional Review Board Sub-Committee of the California State 
University, San Bernardino, and a copy of the official Psychology IRB stamp of 
approval should appear on this consent form.
In this study you will be asked to respond to a survey. The survey will take 
approximately 20 minutes to complete. All of your responses will be held in the 
strictest of confidence by the researchers. You are being asked to provide contact 
information that will be used to invite you for follow up research session. Be assured 
that all data will be kept in strictest confidentiality and will be reported in group form 
only. Results from this study will be available from Dr. Jason Reimer (909) 537-7578 
after January 1, 2009.
Your participation in this study is totally voluntary. You are free not to answer any 
question and withdraw at any time during this study without penalty. This study 
involves no risks beyond those of everyday life, nor any direct benefits to you as an 
individual. When you have completed the survey, you will receive a debriefing 
statement describing the study in more detail. In order to ensure the validity of the 
study, we ask that you not discuss this study with other participants.
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact 
professor Jason Reimer at (909) 537-7578.
By placing a check mark in the box below, I acknowledge that I have been informed 
of, and that I understand, the nature and purpose of this study, that I freely consent to 
participate, and that at the conclusion of the study, I may ask for additional explanation 
regarding the study. I also acknowledge that I am at least 18 years of age.
Place a check mark here □
Today date:____________________
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INFORMED CONSENT
Context Processing
You are invited to participate in a study designed to investigate cognitive processing. 
This study is being conducted by Viara Stankova under the supervision of Dr. Jason 
Reimer, Professor of Psychology. This study has been approved by the Department of 
Psychology Institutional Review Board Sub-Committee of the California State 
University, San Bernardino, and a copy of the official Psychology IRB stamp of 
approval should appear on this consent form.
In this study you will be asked to complete a computer based task, where you will be 
presented with a series of letters on a computer screen. You are asked to respond to 
specific sequences of letters with either target or non-target response. The task should 
take no longer than 40-50 minutes of your time. All of your responses will be held in 
the strictest of confidence by the researchers. All data will be reported in group form 
only. Since no identifying information is collected on the survey, all your responses 
will be completely anonymous. Results from this study will be available from Dr. 
Jason Reimer (909) 537-7578 after Januaiy 1, 2009.
Your participation in this study is totally voluntary. You are free not to answer any 
question and withdraw at any time during this study without penalty. This study 
involves no risks beyond those of everyday life, nor any direct benefits to you as an 
individual. When you have completed the survey, you will receive a debriefing 
statement describing the study in more detail. In order to ensure the validity of the 
study, we ask that you not discuss this study with other participants.
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact Dr. 
Jason Reimer at (909) 537-7578.
By placing a check mark in the box below, I acknowledge that I have been informed 
of, and that I understand, the nature and purpose of this study, that I freely consent to 
participate, and that at the conclusion of the study, I may ask for additional explanation 
regarding the study. I also acknowledge that I am at least 18 years of age.
Place a check mark here □
Today date:____________________
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Debriefing Statement
STAI - Prescreening
The short survey that you have just completed was designed to measure your anxiety 
level. There are two types of anxiety assessed by this survey - state and trait anxiety. 
State anxiety is defined as unpleasant arousal in the face of danger or in threatening 
situation. Trait anxiety on the other hand, measured stable individual differences in the 
tendency to respond with state anxiety in the anticipation of threatening situations.
We have asked that you provide contact information in case you wish to participate in 
the second part of this study. If you chose to do so, your contact information will only 
be used to contact you and set up your visit in our research lab. After that, your contact 
information will be separated from this survey and destroyed. We assure you that your 
confidentiality will be kept at all times during the research process.
Thank you for your participation and for not discussing the contents of this study with 
other students who may in the future participate as well. If you have any questions 
about the study, please feel free to contact Professor Jason Reimer at (909) 537-7578. 
If you would like to obtain a copy of the group results of this study, please contact 
Professor Jason Reimer at (909) 537-7578 in February 2009.
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Debriefing Statement
Context Processing
This study you have just completed was designed to investigate how anxiety levels 
may be related to the representation and maintenance of information in memory in 
order to guide future decisions. In the computer task that you just completed, you had 
to use context in order to perform well. There were four conditions where the letters 
were manipulated: AX (both cue and target were valid), AY (cue was valid but target 
was not valid), BX (non-valid cue but valid target). BY sequences were used as a 
control condition since both cue and probe were non-valid. Typically adults perform 
well on the AX condition, but make more errors in the AY condition than the BX 
condition. This pattern indicates good use of context to guide future behavior. In this 
experiment we will compare the performances of groups of individuals that have either 
high or low trait anxiety and examine the pattern of their performance.
Thank you for your participation and for not discussing the contents of this study with 
other students who may in the future participate as well. If you have any questions 
about the study, please feel free to contact Professor Jason Reimer at (909) 537-7578. 
If you would like to obtain a copy of the group results of this study, please contact 
Professor Jason Reimer at (909) 537-7578 in February 2009.
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